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Joseph Margolis’ Pragmatism
between Narrative and Prophecy 
Rosa M. Calcaterra
1 It is common knowledge that pragmatism acquired a new and quite relevant space within
European philosophical  debate  during  the  second half  of  Nineteen Century,  and  the
leading actors of such a renewed interest for the classics of American thought have been
Karl  Otto  Apel  and  Jürgen  Habermas.  Especially  in  Italy,  the  so  called  revival  of
pragmatism took place via their neo-kantianianism, and actually one could say that the
pragmatist thought has been, so to speak, cleared from previous discredit or, in the best
cases, from a wide-ranging disregard just because of the persistent influence of Kantian
theories on contemporary European philosophy. At the same time, the Apel-Habermas
neo-kantian reevaluation of Peirce, Dewey and Mead appears striking if one considers
that the most unsympathetic European receptions of pragmatism typically were, at the
beginning  of  last  century,  from  the  neo-kantian  milieu.  For  instance,  it  is  worth
mentioning the 1908 Third International  Philosophical  Conference that  took place in
Heidelberg, whose main subject of discussion was the pragmatist theory of knowledge or,
more precisely, that one offered by William James in his book Pragmatism. In fact, this
book was considered by the majority of European intellectuals as the manifesto of the
entire  pragmatist  philosophy;  neo-kantians  or  neo-criticists,  who  were  predominant
within  German  academic  contest  of  that  time,  reacted  to  its  overall  approach  to
traditional questions with a deep disappointment. Giovanni Vailati, one of the very few
Italian supporter of pragmatism at the moment, informs us that these negative reactions
marked the atmosphere of the Conference and finally some supplementary sessions for
discussing pragmatist epistemology were organized.1 One should add that also a number
of  current  commentators  feel  quite  uncomfortable  in  reading  classical  pragmatists’
assertions about Kantian philosophy, including those by Peirce who, as everybody knows,
declared his debts to Kant in so many occasions of his multifaceted work. 
2 The importance of Kant’s philosophy with regard to pragmatist European ‘adventures’ –
both negative and positive – is obviously much more complex than I have said in the very
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brief and necessary incomplete note above sketched. Anyway, Kantian paradigm surely
can be considered as a pivotal, even thought non always explicit, reference point of the
whole debate, old and new, on classical pragmatism and of its many-sided developments.
Joseph Margolis’ book Pragmatist Ascendent. A Yard of Narrative. A Touch of Profecy provides
quite  remarkable  indications  in  that  regard,  pinpointing both the  American and the
European philosophical scene. More precisely, Margolis presents, in his usual intriguing
style, engaging reasons for an ample historical and theoretical understanding of Kant’s
philosophy relevance not only within the international discussions on pragmatism but
also for the making up of its own mostly distinctive features. In fact, according to him,
this  movement  of  thought  mainly  consists in  a  complex  critical  review  of  Kantian
transcendentalism,  a  review which  took  up  the  Hegelian  emphasis  on  the  historical
nature of all human expressions and achievements. The European Journal of Pragmatism and
American  Philosophy is  particularly  pleased to  host  a  symposium on this  book,  which
indeed represents a fascinating drawing of the deep philosophical roots of pragmatist
standpoints as well as of its contemporary increasing relevance. 
3 Joseph Margolis’ philosophical work is extremely vast and ranges from ancient to modern
and contemporary thought, including epistemological, aesthetical, ethical and analytic
philosophy. He is without doubt a leading figure in the philosophical American scene and,
at  the same time,  one of  the most  lively representative of  pragmatism,  analytic  and
European philosophy’s complex interweaving. In my opinion, it is relevant considering
his interest in Protagora and Aristotele, which was in the early years of his research, in
fact I  think that his subsequent philosophical  production retains,  in various outlines,
some traces of ontological, epistemological and ethical problems they consigned to our
cultural history.  I  limit myself to mentioning Protagora’s issue of the epistemological
relativism that, in Margolis’ philosophical discourse, seems to result in his basic assertion
of the constitutive function played by historical and cultural factors for the epistemic
decoding of  reality.  Similarly,  Aristotle’s  biology and his  work’s  realistic  constituents
seem influential on his repeated efforts for concealing relativism and realism, which he
has  always  been  playing  in  a  contrast  with  scientistic  implications  of  U.S.  analytic
philosophy. 
4 The  volume  to  which  our  symposium  is  dedicated  contains  a  number  of  polemic
references to the latter current of  thought that,  as everybody knows,  dominated the
American academic scene since the 1930s, when was introduced by scholars linked to the
Vienna Circle – Reichenbach, Carnap, Hempel, Tarski, Neurath and others – who were
forced to leave Europe for political reasons. Richard Bernstein described this period as
the beginnings of a sort of “silent revolution,” which over the space of a few years led to
the exclusion of pragmatism from the higher levels of philosophical debate. Margolis now
underlines the turnoraund, so to speak, that has occurred both at American and European
level, namely the international recovery of pragmatist perspectives and the transcription
of some typical pragmatist issues in the conceptual and methodological framework of
analytics, which have apparently exhausted – he maintains – their previous importance.
Margolis  principally  reproaches  the  analytic  philosophers  for  having ignored Hegel’s
critics  to  Kant,  or  the  Hegelian  opposition  of  historicity  to  Transcendentalism  and,
therefore, for being victims of the rigorism deriving from the Kantian apriori categories’
doctrine. Just this basic deficiency resulted, according to the American philosopher, the
various  forms  of  scientism  that  characterized  analytic  thought  since  its  outset  and
continues also nowadays, despite some attempts to mitigate such a trait have emerged
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within its own circle. The reputation of analytic philosophy – he writes – “still rests with
its rigor, but rigor is doubtful wherever its best efforts are too slow to admit the failure of
its reductionisms, supervenientisms, eliminativisms, axiomatizations, systems of causal
closure or the rest of the its utopian projects” (111). 
5 The  criticism  of  the  analytics’  lack  of  understanding  Hegel’s  contribution  to  the
overcoming  of  Kantian  transcendentalism  mirrors  perfectly  Margolis’  conception  of
philosophy  as  well  as  his  pragmatism’s  ‘narrative’  and  ‘prophecy.’  To  be  sure,  the
Hegelian  emphasis  on  the  historical  dimension  is  a  liet  motiv  of  his  several  books
concerning  pragmatist  philosophy  and  its  specific  position  within  contemporary
philosophy, particularly: Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Relativism and Realism,
Reinventing  Pragmatism.  American  Philosophy  at  the  End  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  and
Pragmatism Advantages: American and European Philosophy at the End of Twentieth Century. As
regards to the conception of philosophy, there is a tight connection between Hegelian
concept of Bildung and Margolis constructivist perspective on scientific and philosophical
inquiries, a connection whose theoretical nucleus appears in his assertion that the most
essential  Hegel’s  legacy is  the demonstration that  “contingencies  of  the historical  or
geistlich variety” prop up philosophy as “an interpretive discipline that never pretends to
grasp (or need) the impossible rigors of Kantian transcendental necessity or a realist
reading of ‘absolute Idealism’ at its absolute limit” (43). This is probably a questionable
reading of Hegelian idea of philosophy but, as a matter of fact, such assertion summarizes
Margolis’ open option in favor of Hegel’s historicism, and this properly means defending
an overall anti-dogmatic perspective, according to which there aren’t sharp boundaries
neither between philosophical and scientific enquiries and acquirements nor between the
objective and the subjective sides of knowing and reasoning. It is an option that evidently
implies the rejection of any kind of apriorism and, accordingly, the refusal of the Kantian
quest for definitive necessity and universality of our ‘rational’ assertions. However, all
that does not mean embracing skepticism. Otherwise, what is firmly maintained is the
inevitable interference of the cultural and the natural dimensions involved in both the
knowing  and  the  known,  so  that  all  rational-logical-scientific  practices  must  be
considered as constructive processes of truth and objectivity that are always corrigible
and improvable. 
6 It is not difficult noticing the correspondence of Margolis’ constructivist perspective with
one of the most documented features of pragmatist philosophy in general. In fact, he
himself assigns the distinctive mark of contemporary and future pragmatism to a more
and more aware and attentive constructivism, and this particularly means inviting to get
free from the anxiety of ahistorical principles and tools for knowing and acting. It is
worth repeating once again that what here is at stake is the Kant-Hegel controversy, and
the net conviction of the American philosopher that Hegel corrected transcendentalism
introducing an irreversible way of thinking – “the conceptual novelty of a historied and
encultured  world”  –,  which  has  been  confirmed  by  most  of  philosophical  and
epistemological trends developed in late twentieth-century. Of course, Margolis does not
undervalue Kant’s great contribution to the growth of Eurocentric philosophy. In fact he
considers Hegel’s philosophy as a “continuation of the Kantian project,” asserting that
any further progress of philosophical researches cannot but draw the Kantian-Hegelian
line, which marks all contemporary philosophy even thought in so many different ways.
Thus, Ernest Cassirer – to whom Margolis dedicated his interesting 2010 essay Toward a
Theory of Human History – is more than once quoted as representative of a “Hegelianized
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Kantianism” that, in his opinion, also characterizes Peirce’s philosophy, especially as far
as the founder of pragmatism depicts scientific research as an intersubjective activity
that is inevitably effected by historical circumstances and constrains. One could expect a
more  detailed  comparison  between  these  two  thinkers,  both  so  much  engaged  in
theoretical reflection on the logic-symbolic level of human performances, but anyway
there is a very attractive suggestion for a possible combination of their own analysis,
provided the differences – as Margolis underlines – in their reception of Darwinism. 
7 The philosophical importance of Darwinian biological evolutionism is one of the key-
subjects of the book: it makes up Margolis’ constructionism, his reading of Peirce’s most
important questions and, eventually, his ‘prophecy’ for the advancement of pragmatism.
In a nutshell,  his basic thesis is that what present and future philosophy needs is to
enhance pragmatist essential achievements “by conjoining the essential lessons of Hegel
and  what,  independently,  has  been  made  of  Charles  Darwin’s  and  post-Darwinian
inquiries” (54). In other words, the future of the whole of Eurocentric philosophy calls for
‘Darwinizing Hegel’  and ‘Hegelianizing Darwin,’  as – according to Margolis – classical
pragmatists more or less explicitly actually did, although without a full understanding of
the implications of such a philosophical strategy (119-20). This is a task still open but it is
essential considering that classical pragmatism was a continuation of Hegel’s corrections
of Kantian transcendentalism along a naturalistic line. The improvement of pragmatism
implies just a development of such very special naturalistic line, taking advantage from
the  post-darwinian  paleoanthropology  so  that  constructivism  would  result  the  only
inevitable solution to the problem of knowledge. 
8 In  a  quite  complex  passage  of  the  book,  Margolis  describes  what  he  means  by
‘constructivism’: 
I use the terms ‘constructed,’ ‘constructive,’ ‘constructivist’ in two quite different
but hardly unrelated senses: in one, ‘constructive’ means ‘artifactual’ (or ‘hybrid’) –
in  the  specific  sense  in  which  the  self  and  all  things  cultural  are  artifactual
transforms  of  the  biological  or  material;  in  the  other,  ‘constructivist’  means
‘conceptually inseparable’ – in the sense in which the contribution of the subjective
and objective “parts” of cognitive states cannot be separately assessed. The first
draws  attention  to  the  cultural  dimensions  of  all  forms  of  inquiry  and  human
intelligence;  the  second,  the  impossibility  of  outflanking  the  contingency  of
cognitive claims. Together, the two senses account for the ‘constructivist’ nature of
the  realism  of  science  (and  metaphysics)  –  consistent  with  preserving  the
distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions. (38-9) 
9 I think this passage can be considered as a significant summary of the overall Margolis’
theoretical  contribution  to  contemporary  philosophy,  a  contribution  which,  in  my
opinion, is perfectly in line with the non reductionist form of naturalism that is claimed
by classical as well as by the majority of today’s pragmatists. 
10 Of course, the attribution of a naturalism of some kind to Peirce – as Margolis invites – is
quite open to discussion, in fact a lot of critical studies insist definitely on peircean anti-
naturalist assertions. As far as I am concerned, Margolis’ interpretative line is more than
justified, provided my conviction that any interpretation of great philosophical works
cannot but favouring some particular aspect, and this is especially relevant in relation to
Peirce’s  non  systematic  and  typically  many-sided  work.  Indeed,  in  agreement  with
Gadamer, I am convinced that the readings of works of the past could be all the more
fruitful the more they are nourished by the need to find possible answers to current
question, and this seems to me Margolis’ constant attitude towards the writings of the
Joseph Margolis’ Pragmatism between Narrative and Prophecy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
4
classical  pragmatists  as  well  as  of  Kant,  Hegel  and  other  great  figures  of  Western
philosophical history. I consider this aspect as a salient and very positive feature of his
intense research activity, which this book establishes as promising of new, meaningful
suggestions, mainly with regard to a more and more fertile relationship of philosophy
with  human and natural  sciences  that  should  generate  a  theory  of  the  self  actually
coherent with the non reductionist naturalism he theorizes. 
11 Let  me  conclude  my  remarks  by  pointing  out  Margolis’  effort  to  demonstrate  the
centrality  of  fallibilism  within  Peirce’s  thought,  and  above  all  his  indication  of  the
essential  strength  of  peircian  concept  of  ‘infinite  hope’  for  reconciling  realism  and
idealism. However, I do not find important to demonstrate that fallibilism is, so to speak,
the ‘very essence’ of Peirce’s philosophy, as Margolis apparently claims along his debate
with Nathan Hauser. The search for a philosopher’s unique, definitive conceptual devise
or purpose seems to me in contrast not only with his interpretative style of philosophical
works, as above mentioned, but also with the following paradigmatic peircian assertion 
Philosophy ought […] trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments
than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which
is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link,  but  a  cable  whose  fibres  may  be  ever  so
slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.2 
12 Thus, I wonder whether it would not be useful to turn to James, who is mostly neglected
in this book, reflecting in particular on Jamesian perspectivism and pluralist metaphysics
in order to corroborate the theoretical framework advocated by Margolis. Indeed, in my
opinion, one can find on both sides motives quite compatible with the perspectives of the
book here at issue: above all, on the one hand, one could appeal to the realist instance
that pervades James’ perspectivism and, more generally, to his own effort to combine
realism and idealism; on the other hand, one could find a specific reference point for a
non  reductionist  naturalism  in  the  concept  of  ‘possibility’  supporting  Jamesian
metaphysics,  which indeed gets rid of  the concept of  ‘essence’  so central  in Western
traditional metaphysics. Most probably, especially Margolis’ crucial conception of the self
as  ‘natural  artifact’  could  take  advantage  from Jamesian philosophical  translation  of
Darwin’s biological evolutionism, considering also the deep ethical implications assigned
to the category of possibility by the author of The Principles of Psychology.
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NOTES
1. For an account of early German and Austrian reception of pragmatism, see M. Ferrari 2010a,
and 2010b.
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